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This paper is concerned with the New Consensus Macroeconomics (NCM) in the case of an 
open economy. It outlines and explains briefly the main elements of and way of thinking 
about the macroeconomy from the standpoint of both its theoretical and its policy 
dimensions. There are a few problems with this particular theoretical framework. We focus 
here on two important aspects closely related to NCM: the absence of banks and monetary 
aggregates from this theoretical framework, and the way the notion of the “equilibrium real 
rate of interest” is utilized by the same framework. The analysis is critical of NCM from a 
Keynesian perspective.  
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A New Consensus in macroeconomics (NCM) has emerged over the past decade or so and 
has become highly influential in terms of current macroeconomics thinking and of 
macroeconomic policy, especially monetary policy. The NCM is now firmly established 
amongst both academia and economic policy circles. It is also true to say that it draws heavily 
on the so-called new Keynesian economics [see Meyer (2001) for an introduction; Woodford 
(2003) for very detailed elaboration, albeit using the term neo-Wicksellian; and the Bank of 
England (2005) for a model along NCM lines in the context of building a macroeconomic 
model].
1 The birth of NCM was made possible after the collapse of the Grand Neoclassical 
Synthesis in the 1970s.
2 Macroeconomists never took much notice of the reconstruction of 
New Classical macroeconomics with rational expectations. By contrast, New Keynesian 
macroeconomics was transformed into what we now label as New Consensus 
Macroeconomics. The latter has managed to encapsulate those early developments of 
macroeconomics in the 1970s, including rational expectation, but with assumptions that were 
also acceptable to the old neoclassical synthesis proponents. Galí and Gertler (2007) suggest 
that the New Keynesian paradigm, which arose in the 1980s, provided sound 
microfoundations along with the concurrent development of the real business cycle approach 
that promoted the explicit optimization behavior aspect. Those developments, along with 
macroeconomic features that previous paradigms lacked (such as the long-run vertical 
Phillips curve), resulted in the NCM. Woodford (2009: 2–3) argues that the New Consensus 
has come about “because progress in macroeconomic analysis has made it possible to see that 
the alternative which earlier generations felt it necessary to choose were not so thoroughly 
incompatible when understood more deeply.”  
The policy implications of the NCM paradigm are particularly important for this 
development aspect of macroeconomics. Price stability can be achieved through monetary 
policy since inflation is a monetary phenomenon; as such it can only be controlled through 
changes in the rate of interest. It is, thus, agreed that monetary policy is effective as a means 
of inflation control. This is no longer controversial in view of “the worldwide success of 
disinflation policies of the 1980s and 1990s” (Woodford 2009:12–13). Goodfriend (2007) 
also argues that this particular set of propositions, amongst many other, has been backed by 
actual monetary policy experience in the United States and other countries around the globe, 
                                                 
1 The NCM framework, and its implications for monetary policy, was suggested initially by Goodfriend and 
King (1997) and Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999). For an extensive theoretical treatment see Woodford (2003). 
2 See Galí and Gertler (2007) for a summary of the reasons for the collapse of neoclassical Economics.  
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following the abandonment of money supply rules in the early 1980s.
3 Academic 
contributions also helped the foundations of the NCM on both theoretical and empirical 
grounds; for example, “[t]he Taylor Rule became the most common way to model monetary 
policy” [Goodfriend (2007: 59); see also, Orphanides (2007)]. In fact, for Goodfriend (2007: 
59), “[o]ne reason the Federal Reserve began to talk openly about interest rate policy in 1994 
was that academic economists had begun to do so. Indeed, thinking about monetary policy as 
interest rate policy is one of the hallmarks of the new consensus that has made possible 
increasingly fruitful interaction between academics and central bankers.”
4    
The discussion and assessment of the NCM in this contribution is in the context of an 
open economy; see Arestis (2007b). We begin in section 2, after this introduction, with the 
open economy aspect of the NCM, which enables some attention to be given to the exchange 
rate channel of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in addition to the aggregate 
demand channel and the inflation expectations channel. In the context of this extended model 
of NCM, its policy implications are examined in the same section. We critically appraise 
NCM and its policy implications in section 3, while section 4, the final section, summarizes 
and concludes. 
   
2. AN OPEN ECONOMY NEW CONSENSUS MACROECONOMICS AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
We discuss an open economy NCM model first, followed by its policy implications. It is 
worth noting at the outset that the NCM is a framework in which there is no role for “money 
and banking,” and there is only a single rate of interest.
5 Two of the key assumptions made 
are worth emphasizing: the first is that price stability is the primary objective of monetary 
policy; the second is that inflation is a monetary phenomenon and, as such, it can only be 
controlled by monetary policy means, this being the rate of interest under the control of the 
central bank. This should be undertaken through interest rate manipulation. Monetary policy 
                                                 
3 Goodfriend (2007) refers to a number of examples: notably New Zealand and Canada were the first countries 
to adopt the economic policy implications of the NCM framework in the early 1990s. The UK and Canada 
followed similar initiatives shortly afterwards in 1992, with many other countries adopting similar policies since 
that period (with the developing and emerging world following suit by the end of the 1990s; indeed, the IMF, in 
the case of Brazil in 1999, strongly recommended the adoption of NCM-type of economic policies). 
4 We would caution the reader in terms of the claims of the NCM supporters in view of more recent assessment 
of the NCM and its policy implications; see, for example, Angeriz and Arestis (2007, 2008, and 2009); Arestis 
and Sawyer (2003, 2004a, and 2004b). 
5 There is, of course, the role of money as a unit of account. However, in view of real money balances being a 
negligible component of total wealth, there are no wealth effects of money on spending. Although monetary 
policy is central in NCM, money plays no role other than being a unit of account (Galí and Gertler 2007: 28–
29).  
  4
is thereby upgraded, but, at the same time, fiscal policy is downgraded. This raises the issue 
of whether deflation is maniputable through changes in interest rates since the latter cannot 
fall below zero. These and many other aspects of the NCM framework are further highlighted 
and discussed in what follows in this section. 
 
2.1 The Open Economy NCM Model 
Drawing on Arestis (2007b) [see, also, Angeriz and Arestis (2007)], we utilize the following 
six-equation model for this purpose. 
 
(1)   Yg t  = a0 + a1Ygt-1 + a2Et(Ygt+1) + a3[Rt – Et(pt+1)] + a4(rer)t + s1 
 
(2) pt    = b1Y
g
t + b2pt-1 + b3Et(pt+1) + b4[Et(pwt+1) - EtΔ(er)t] + s2 
 
(3)   Rt   = (1- c3)[RR* + Et(pt+1) + c1Y
g
t-1 + c2(pt-1 – p
T)] + c3Rt-1 + s3 
 
(4)   (rert)  = d0 + d1[[(Rt
 - Et(pt+1)] – [(Rwt) - E(pwt+1)]] + d2(CA)t + d3E(rer)t+1 + s4 
 
(5)   (CA)t = e0 + e1(rer)t  + e2Y
g
 t +  e3 Y
g
wt + s5        
 
(6)   ert = rert + Pwt - Pt   
 
The symbols have the following meaning: a0 is a constant that could reflect, inter alia, 
the fiscal policy stance; Y
g is the domestic output gap and Y
g
w is the world output gap; R is 
nominal rate of interest (and Rw is the world nominal interest rate); p is the rate of inflation 
(and p
w is the world inflation rate); p
T is the inflation rate target; RR* is the “equilibrium” 
real rate of interest, that is, the rate of interest consistent with zero output gap, which implies 
from equation (2) a constant rate of inflation; (rer) stands for the real exchange rate and (er) 
for the nominal exchange rate, defined as in equation (6) and expressed as foreign currency 
units per domestic currency unit; Pw and P (both in logarithms) are world and domestic price 
levels, respectively; CA is the current account of the balance of payments; si (with i = 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5) represents stochastic shocks; and Et refers to expectations held at time t. The change in 
the nominal exchange rate, as it appears in equation (2), can be derived from equation (6) as 
in Δer =  Δrer + pwt - pt.   
  5
  Equation (1) is the aggregate demand equation with the current output gap determined 
by past and expected future output gap, the real rate of interest, and the real exchange rate 
(through effects of demand for exports and imports). It is important to also note that what 
monetary policy is thought to influence via this relationship, therefore, is the output gap, 
namely the difference between actual output from trend output. The latter is the output that 
prevails when prices are perfectly flexible without any cyclical distortions in place; it is, thus, 
a long-run variable, determined by the supply side of the economy. Equation (1) emanates 
from intertemporal optimization of expected lifetime utility that reflects optimal consumption 
smoothing subject to a budget constraint; see, for example, Blanchard and Fischer (1989: 
Chapter 2).
6 It is, thus, a forward-looking expectational relationship, which implies that the 
marginal rate of substitution between current and future consumption, ignoring uncertainty 
and adjusted for the subjective rate of time discount, is equal to the gross real rate of interest. 
There are both lagged adjustment and forward-looking elements. The intertemporal utility 
optimization is based on the assumption that all debts are ultimately paid in full, thereby 
removing all credit risk and default. This follows from the assumption of what is known 
technically as the transversality condition, which means, in effect, that all economic agents 
with their rational expectations are perfectly credit worthy. All IOUs in the economy can, and 
would, be accepted in exchange. There is, thus, no need for a specific monetary asset. All 
fixed-interest financial assets are identical so that there is a single rate of interest in any 
period. Over time the single rate of interest may change as borrowing and savings 
propensities change. Under such circumstance no individual economic agent or firm is 
liquidity constrained at all. There is, thus, no need for financial intermediaries (commercial 
banks or other nonbank financial intermediaries) or even money [see, also, Goodhart (2007 
and 2008) and Buiter (2008)]. Clearly, then, by basing the NCM model on the transversality 
condition, the supporters have turned the model into an essentially nonmonetary model. So it 
is no surprise that private banking institutions or monetary variables are not essential in the 
NCM framework.
7 It is rather amazing how such a nonmonetary approach has been taken on 
board by central banks around the world. 
Furthermore, there is the question of the role for investment. The basic analysis 
(Woodford 2003: Chapter 4) is undertaken for households optimizing their utility function in 
                                                 
6 Woodford (2009) suggests that the “intertemporal general-equilibrium foundation,” which used to be a 
contentious issue among macroeconomists, is now so widely accepted that it has become an important element 
of current macroeconomic analysis. 
7 The explicit nonappearance of nominal money in the model is justified on the assumption that the central bank 
allows the money stock to be what is necessary to achieve the desired real rate of interest. Money is thereby a 
residual; see Woodford (2008) for a recent contribution.   
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terms of the time path of consumption. Investment can then be introduced in terms of the 
expansion of the capital stock, which is required to underpin the growth of income. In effect, 
the future path of the economy is mapped out and, consequently, the time path of the capital 
stock. Investment ensures the adjustment of the capital stock to the predetermined time path. 
There is then, by assumption, no impact of the path of the economy on the capital stock. 
There is not what we may term an independent investment function in the sense of arising 
from firms’ decisions taken in the light of profit and growth opportunities, separated from 
savings decisions of households. Woodford (2003) summarizes the argument rather well 
when he suggests that “One of the more obvious omissions in the basic neo-Wicksellian 
model […] is the absence of any effect of variations in private spending upon the economy’s 
productive capacity and hence upon supply costs in subsequent periods” (Woodford 2003: 
352). 
Equation (2) is a Phillips curve with inflation based on current output gap, past and 
future inflation, expected changes in the nominal exchange rate, and expected world prices 
(and the latter pointing towards imported inflation). The model allows for sticky prices, the 
lagged price level in this relationship, and full price flexibility in the long run. It is assumed 
that b2 + b3 + b4 = 1 in equation (2), thereby implying a vertical Phillips curve.
8 The real 
exchange rate affects the demand for imports and exports, and thereby the level of demand 
and economic activity. The term Et (pt+1) in equation (2) captures the forward-looking 
property of inflation. It actually implies that the success of a central bank in containing 
inflation depends not only on its current policy stance, but also on what economic agents 
perceive that stance to be in the future. The assumption of rational expectations is important 
in this respect. Agents are in a position to know how the economy works and the 
consequences of their actions that take place today for the future. This implies that economic 
agents know how monetary authorities would react to macroeconomic developments, which 
influence their actions today. In this sense the practice of modern central banking can be 
described as the management of private expectations. Consequently, the term Et(pt+1) can be 
seen to reflect central bank credibility. If a central bank can credibly signal its intention to 
achieve and maintain low inflation, then expectations of inflation will be lowered and this 
term indicates that it may be possible to reduce current inflation at a significantly lower cost 
                                                 
8 The assumption of a vertical long-run Phillips curve implies no voluntary unemployment. This is clearly not 
acceptable, as some contributors have pointed out; see, for example, Blanchard (2008). The way to introduce 
unemployment into the NCM model is still to be undertaken.    
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in terms of output than otherwise. In this way monetary policy operates through the 
expectations channel.
9        
Equation (3) is a monetary-policy rule, where the nominal interest rate is based on 
expected inflation, output gap, deviation of inflation from target (or “inflation gap”), and the 
“equilibrium” real rate of interest. The lagged interest rate (often ignored in the literature) 
represents interest rate “smoothing” undertaken by the monetary authorities. Equation (3), the 
operating rule, implies that “policy” becomes a systematic adjustment to economic 
developments in a predictable manner. Inflation above the target leads to higher interest rates 
to contain inflation, whereas inflation below the target requires lower interest rates to 
stimulate the economy and increase inflation. In the tradition of Taylor rules (Taylor 1993, 
1999, and  2001), the exchange rate is assumed to play no role in the setting of interest rates 
(except in so far as changes in the exchange rate have an effect on the rate of inflation which 
clearly would feed into the interest rate rule). The monetary policy rule in equation (3) 
embodies the notion of an equilibrium rate of interest, labeled as RR*. Equation (3) indicates 
that when inflation is on target and output gap is zero, the actual real rate set by monetary 
policy rule is equal to this equilibrium rate. This implies that, provided the central bank has 
an accurate estimate of RR*, the economy can be guided to an equilibrium of the form of a 
zero output gap and constant inflation (at an interest rate equal to the pre-set target). In this 
case, equation (1) indicates that aggregate demand is at a level that is consistent with a zero 
output gap. In a private sector economy, this would imply that the real interest rate RR* 
brings equality between (ex ante) savings and investment. This equilibrium rate of interest 
corresponds to the Wicksellian “natural rate” of interest, which equates savings and 
investment at a supply-side equilibrium level of income.
10 
Equation (4) determines the exchange rate as a function of the real interest rate 
differentials, current account position, and expectations of future exchange rates (through 
domestic factors such as risk premiums, domestic public debt, the degree of credibility of the 
inflation target, etc.). Equation (5) determines the current account position as a function of 
the real exchange rate and domestic and world output gaps. Finally, equation (6) expresses 
the nominal exchange rate in terms of the real exchange rate. There are six equations and six 
unknowns: output, interest rate, inflation, real exchange rate, current account, and nominal 
                                                 
9 The view that credibly anchoring inflation expectations, which produces a more favorable trade-off between 
inflation and economic activity, has been criticized as failing to explain persuasively why it is so important. It 
fails to demonstrate whether price setters change their decisions on the basis of what their expectations of 
inflation would be in the future (Blanchard 2008: 21).    
10 Woodford (2003: 248) defines RR* as the “equilibrium real rate of return when prices are fully flexible.”  
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exchange rate defined as in (6). Exchange rate considerations are postulated [as in equation 
(3)] not to play any direct role in the setting of interest rates by the central bank.
11  
 
2.2 NCM Policy Implications 
The major economic policy implication of the NCM is that monetary policy has been 
upgraded in the form of interest rate policy, where a major objective of policy is “maintaining 
price stability” (King 2005: 2).
12 This policy is undertaken through inflation targeting (IT). 
Fiscal policy, by contrast, should only be concerned with possibly broadly balancing 
government expenditure and taxation, effectively downgrading its importance as an active 
instrument of economic policy. This is an assumption based on the usual arguments of 
crowding out of government deficits and, thus, the ineffectiveness of fiscal policy; see, 
however, Arestis and Sawyer (2003) for a critique and a different view. 
An important assumption that permits monetary policy to have the effect that it is 
assigned by the NCM is the existence of temporary nominal rigidities in the form of sticky 
wages, prices, and information, or some combination of these frictions, so that the central 
bank, by manipulating the nominal rate of interest, is able to influence real interest rates and, 
hence, real spending in the short run.
13 A further important aspect of IT is the role of 
“expected inflation” embedded in equation (3). The inflation target itself and the forecasts of 
the central bank are thought of as providing a strong steer to the perception of expected 
inflation. Given the lags in the transmission mechanism of the rate of interest to inflation, and 
the imperfect control of inflation, inflation forecasts become the intermediate target of 
monetary policy in this framework, where the ultimate target is the actual inflation rate 
(Svensson 1997 and 1999). Under these circumstances, “[t]he central bank’s forecast 
becomes an explicit intermediate target. Inflation targeting can then be viewed as a monetary 
policy framework under which policy decisions are guided by expected future inflation 
relative to an announced target” (Agénor 2002: 151). Furthermore, the target and forecasts 
add an element of transparency seen as a paramount ingredient of IT. Consequently, inflation 
forecasting is a key element of IT. It is, indeed, argued that it represents a synthesis of simple 
monetary rules and discretionary monetary policy and, as such, it constitutes an improvement 
over targeting monetary aggregates and weaker versions of IT (Woodford 2007). This 
                                                 
11 This treatment of the exchange rate has been criticized; see, for example, Angeriz and Arestis (2007). 
12 King (2005: 2) also argues that “[f]ar from being ineffective, a monetary policy aimed at price stability has 
proved to be the key to successful management of aggregate demand.” However, the experience since the credit 
crunch of August 2007 does not seem to validate this claim.  
13 It should be noted that although a great deal of work has been undertaken on monetary policy in the presence 
of nominal rigidities, the same could not be said for fiscal policy. No satisfactory theory of fiscal policy has 
emerged so far under the assumption of nominal rigidities; see, also, Blanchard (2008).   
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inflation-forecast IT, however, entails a serious problem, which is due to the large margins of 
error in forecasting inflation; this can damage the reputation and credibility of central banks.  
The problem just alluded to, though, is contained to some extent by utilizing a 
probabilistic approach to present inflation forecasts under these circumstances, the so-called 
“fan chart” of the Bank of England in the UK. This can potentially alleviate the reputation 
and credibility problems of the central bank. The latter, by signaling the uncertainty inherent 
in economic forecasts, can contain the potential damage to its reputation and credibility, but 
there is still the problem of how interest-rate projections are undertaken. The two types 
already used by central banks—constant-interest-rate projections or projections based on 
market expectations—are problematic, as Woodford (2007) highlights. The main problem 
common to both approaches to projections is that the nominal interest rate will remain fixed 
in the future regardless of how inflation evolves in the first case; or that it is exogenously 
determined, again unaffected by inflation in the second case. Either projection cannot be 
sustained. Woodford (2007) suggests that a way forward would be the adoption of a forecast-
IT approach, which would also be concerned with output stabilization, but even in this 
approach the problems just alluded to would still be there. Still, there can be a self-justifying 
element to inflation forecasting in so far as inflation expectations build on forecasts, which 
then influence actual inflation. It is also true that such forecasts are not always available 
(Goodhart 2005). Central banks decide on changes in interest rates in view of forecasts of 
future inflation as it deviates from its target along with output as it deviates from potential 
output, but such forecasts are not easily available or, when they are published, this is 
undertaken on an ex post basis—after the decision on interest rate change has been 
undertaken. The centrality of inflation forecasts in the conduct of this type of monetary policy 
represents a major challenge to countries that pursue IT.    
There is still the question of the extent to which NCM is useful for policy analysis. 
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2008) argue that the NCM models are not useful for policy 
analysis. From the point of view of this contribution, the relevant criticism applies to the use 
of equation (3) and the manipulation of the short-term rate of interest for monetary policy 
purposes. The assumption is that the short-term rate of interest is stationary and ergodic. This 
assumption implies, of course, that the long-term rate of interest is smoother than what the 
data reveal. This implies that NCM models do not identify the source of inflation persistence 
and expectations accurately and, as such, conclusions on the costs of disinflation are not 
accurate. The NCM policy advice is thereby erroneous.  
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3. ASSESSING THE NCM THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
A number of arguments have emerged from previous assessment exercises of the NCM 
framework and of the IT policy as implemented in a number of countries. It is worth 
summarizing the arguments that relate to this contribution. These arguments include: low 
inflation and price stability do not always lead to macroeconomic stability (Angeriz and 
Arestis 2007 and 2008); insufficient attention is paid to the exchange rate (Angeriz and 
Arestis 2007); there is insufficient evidence for a long-run vertical Phillips curve (Juselius 
2008); there is insufficient evidence that NAIRU is unaffected by aggregate demand and 
economic policy (Arestis, Baddeley, and Sawyer 2007) and by flexible labor markets (Arestis 
and Sawyer 2007); countries that do not pursue IT policies have done as well as the IT 
countries in terms of the impact of IT on inflation and locking-in inflation expectations at low 
levels of inflation (Angeriz and Arestis 2007 and 2008); there is insufficient evidence to 
downgrade fiscal policy (Angeriz and Arestis 2009); there is insufficient evidence that the 
NCM theoretical propositions are validated by the available empirical evidence (Arestis and 
Sawyer 2004b and 2008); and the IT policy framework can only pretend to tackle demand-
pull inflation, but not cost-push inflation (Arestis and Sawyer 2009). The recent August 2007 
credit crunch episode has vividly testified to this problem of the NCM economic policy 
aspect.
14   
In what follows we deal with three further criticisms: the absence of banks and 
monetary aggregates in the NCM theoretical framework; related aspects with monetary 
policy; and with the use of the equilibrium real rate of interest as in equation (3) above. We 
begin with the case of no banks and no money in the NCM model. 
 
3.1 No Banks, No Money 
As explained above, the NCM model is characterized by an interest-rate rule, where the 
money market and financial institutions are typically not mentioned, let alone modeled. The 
downgrading of monetary aggregates in NCM models has gone too far, even for non-
monetarists; see, for example, Goodhart (2007). It is also the case that in the NCM model 
there is no mention of banks in the analysis. It has been noted that in the major text of 
Woodford (2003), banks make no appearance in the index (Goodhart 2004), but, then, banks 
and their decisions play a considerably significant role in the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy. Furthermore, decisions by banks as to whether or not to grant credit play a 
                                                 
14 Interestingly enough, Buiter (2008: 31) laments that over the last 30 years we have had “too little Minsky 
(1982) in our thinking about the roles of money and finance in the business cycle.”   
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major role in the expansion of the economy, in the sense that failure of banks to supply credit 
would imply that expansion of expenditure cannot occur. It is also the case that in the real 
world many economic agents are liquidity constrained. They do not have sufficient assets to 
sell or the ability to borrow. Their expenditures are limited to their current income and few 
assets, if any. Consequently, this perfect capital market assumption, which implies the 
absence of credit rationing (meaning that some individuals are credit constrained), means that 
the only effect of monetary policy would be a “price effect” as the rate of interest is changed. 
The parts of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, which involve credit rationing 
and changes in the nonprice terms on which credit is supplied, are excluded by assumption. 
There is also the question of risk and uncertainty and the assumption of a single 
interest rate (Goodhart 2007). The perceived riskiness of borrowers and uncertainty clearly 
implies that a single interest rate cannot capture reality. A whole schedule of interest rates is 
more appropriate and realistic. In the downswing of the cycle, official interest rates decline, 
but risk premia rise. It thereby becomes ambiguous as to the way interest rates move. In the 
upswing of the cycle, official interest rates rise on the whole, but risk premia fall. It would be 
wise to cross-check for the combined effects of official changes in the rate of interest and risk 
aversion. This, it is argued, can be undertaken by studying the time path of money and credit 
aggregates (Goodhart 2007). These observations clearly suggest that there is a disjuncture 
between the NCM analysis and the role of monetary policy. The NCM model is thereby 
incomplete and unsuitable for monetary-policy analysis. Indeed, it “leaves open the 
underlying question of how the central bank manages to fix the chosen interest rate in the first 
place” (Friedman 2003: 6). 
More specifically, the prominent reasons for such uneasiness normally referred to are 
the absence of any role for financial intermediation and monetary aggregates, as well as 
distinctions among short-term interest rates that play different roles in the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy (Canzoneri et al. 2008; Goodfriend and McCallum 2006). The 
interesting question is, what would happen if banks and money markets were to be 
incorporated in the NCM framework? Two issues become very relevant: the first is the extent 
to which the NCM model would then give a more accurate account of macroeconomic 
behavior; the second would be the role of monetary aggregates in such an extended model. 
Canzoneri et al. (2008) have undertaken such an exercise.
15 The “standard” NCM model, 
with no banks or monetary aggregates (essentially Ricardian so that fiscal and debt 
                                                 
15 Another paper that has put forward a model with banks and money is Goodfriend and McCallum (2006). 
While there are differences with the Canzoneri et al. (2008) paper, the two studies are complementary to each 
other.    
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management policies play no important role) is compared with a similar “enlarged” model, 
which is endowed by including banks that create deposits and make loans along with a non-
Ricardian element that gives fiscal policy some role. The enlarged NCM model introduces 
real money balances (essentially cash and bank deposits, the M2 definition of money, which 
are used for transaction purposes) and real government bond holdings (on the assumption that 
economic agents use government bonds to manage their liquidity) in the representative 
household’s utility function. In this sense, the enlarged NCM model is a more complete 
modeling of the economy than the standard NCM model. The enlarged NCM provides for 
bank deposits and loans, where bank loans may affect aggregate demand and supply; in this 
way, it brings a role for government bonds in household and bank liquidity, and provides an 
endogenous spread between the money market rate in the central bank’s interest-rate rule and 
the rate of return in the representative agent utility function. Clearly, the standard NCM 
model is a less complete modeling of the economy, but it has the virtue of simplicity and 
gives, in this view, an adequate account of macroeconomic behavior.  
Canzoneri et al. (2008) calibrate the two models in an attempt to ascertain the extent 
of their differences. The unconditional moments generated by the models are compared and 
contrasted. Impulse response functions are utilized to study how various shocks infiltrate 
through the model economies. As one might expect, differences do prevail, but two are the 
most relevant for the purposes of our contribution. A bond-financed change in government 
spending has a bigger and more persistent effect on inflation in the enlarged model than in the 
standard model. Monetary indicators are useful in forecasting inflation in the enlarged NCM 
model; not so in the standard NCM model. Still, the authors do not recommend M2-targeting 
monetary policy. This is because a broader measure of liquidity is shown to be a more 
reliable indicator of inflation than simply M2, but it is readily admitted that this is a 
controversial proposition that deserves more careful scrutiny. In this sense, Goodhart (2007: 
12) is right to suggest that “the rate of growth of bank lending to the private sector is a more 
important monetary aggregate than broad money itself.” 
The next compelling question is how real money balances should enter equation (1). 
This can be undertaken through the assumption that marginal utility of consumption depends 
on real money balances. The standard way is to resort to the money-in-the-utility function 
models, whereby real money balances are supposed to affect the marginal utility of 
consumption and, as such, enter equation (1) in the above six-equation model. This is the 
non-separability principle. A utility function is additively separable between consumption 
and real money balances if it can be separated into two functions, one containing only  
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consumption and the other only money. If the utility function is not additively separable then 
real balances will enter equation (1). Early evidence produced by Kremer, Lombardo, and 
Werner (2003) in the case of Germany supports the non-separability assumption. Subsequent 
studies, however, reach the opposite conclusion. The empirical work undertaken by Ireland 
(2004), Andres, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2006), and Jones and Stracca (2008) suggest that 
there is little evidence that supports the inclusion of real money balances in equation (1) in 
the cases of the United States, the euro area, and the UK. Friedman (2003: 6) appears to be 
correct when he argues that without “integrating the credit markets into both the theoretical 
and the practical analysis of monetary policy is going to be harder.”
16  
 
3.2 Monetary Policy Issues 
The NCM theoretical framework relies heavily on the “efficient markets hypothesis” (EMH), 
which assumes that all unfettered markets clear continuously, thereby making disequilibria 
(such as bubbles) highly unlikely. Indeed, economic policy designed to eliminate bubbles 
would lead to “financial repression,” a very bad outcome in this view. The experience with 
financial liberalization is that it caused a number of deep financial crises and problems 
unparalleled in world financial history, culminating to the financial crisis of August 2007. It 
is true that over the recent past, when bubbles emerged, monetary authorities of the major 
central banks have argued that monetary policy should not interfere with the free functioning 
of financial markets. Proactive monetary policy under such circumstances would require the 
authorities to outperform market participants. Central bankers prefer to deal with the 
consequences of the burst of a bubble by minimizing the damages to the real economy—an 
approach that has been adopted by all major central banks around the world. This was 
especially so after then-governor of the Federal Reserve System (Fed), Alan Greenspan, who 
attempted to fend the economy from the “new technology bubble” did not “lean against the 
wind” in the presence of emerging bubbles. The housing bubble, which precipitated the 
financial crisis of August 2007, is viewed as the result of the policies that Alan Greenspan 
pursued in the first half of 2000s. The argument is then that such focus and acceptance 
outrightly of the EMH leads to serious mistakes in terms of monetary policy.
17 Asset-price 
targeting may be necessary after all; see Wadhwani (2008) for a recent restatement. We 
                                                 
16 Curdia and Woodford (2008) introduce risk premia, the spread between “saver and borrower” interest rates, in 
the basic representative-household NCM model. This, they argue, makes very little difference to the predicted 
effects of monetary policy. It should be noted, though, risk premia in this approach are introduced on an ad hoc 
basis; a great deal more work is needed to make the argument persuasive.    
17 A number of contributors have suggested that monetary authorities were slow to react to the bubbles burst in 
2007; see, for example, Wadhwani (2008). They were slow in reducing interest rates, which may very well lead 
to a deeper and longer recession than otherwise.   
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would go further than merely targeting asset prices and agree with Arestis and Karakitsos 
(2009), who suggest that targeting net wealth of the personal sector, as a percent of 
disposable income, is a more important monetary policy option. Net wealth is defined as the 
assets (financial and tangible) less the liabilities of the personal sector, which include 
mortgage debt and consumer credit. Such a wealth target deals with the consequences of the 
rise and fall of asset prices in the economy and is not a target of asset prices per se—equities 
or houses. Net wealth is an ideal variable to monitor (and control) bubbles simply because it 
is at the heart of the transmission mechanism of asset prices and debt to consumption. 
Monetary policy should be tightened/loosened as the ratio of net wealth-to-disposable 
income, over a period of time, is above/below a predetermined threshold. This would allow 
asset price booms, but it would prevent them from becoming bubbles that will ultimately 
burst with huge adverse consequences for the economy as a whole. Such an approach will 
also help regulate financial engineering, since the central bank will monitor the implications 
of financial innovations as they impact net wealth, even if it is ignorant of them. Financial 
engineering is so complex that central banks have a tough time in measuring, monitoring, and 
controlling the total liquidity in the economy. A net wealth target will check the 
consequences of this liquidity, while not impeding the financial engineering of the banks. 
Another serious omission by the NCM supporters is the role of what Keynes (1936) 
described as “animal spirits,” namely the possibility that individuals act irrationally and for 
noneconomic reasons. Failure to recognize the importance of “animal spirits” in monetary 
policy can lead to wrong conclusions, for under such circumstances, monetary policy can 
become ineffective. Witness the experience since August 2007, over which period interest 
rates have been reduced substantially, but have had a very feeble effect. Also, the idea that 
recapitalizing the banks would allow them to lend again has not worked. Once “confidence” 
evaporates, banks refuse to lend, however well capitalized they may happen to be. So much 
so that quantitative easing, whereby the government guarantees assets acquired by the central 
bank, may be necessary. Indeed, full-scale nationalization of the banking sector is not ruled 
out either.      
A further problem, in view of the absence of a banking sector in the NCM theoretical 
framework, is that changes in the rate of interest, which can have serious effects through bank 
lending, are completely absent from any consideration by the NCM. A change in the rate of 
interest can have an impact on the supply of credit through the so-called “credit channel of 
monetary policy” in the context of imperfect capital markets (Bernanke and Gertler 1995). 
This channel is proposed under the assumption of imperfect capital markets, one that the  
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NCM proponents stay away from in view of the transversality assumption. There are two 
channels under this category: the narrow credit channel and the broad credit channel, which 
are distinct, but complementary, ways whereby imperfections in financial markets might 
affect real magnitudes in the economy. They are concerned with how changes in the financial 
positions of lenders and borrowers can affect aggregate demand in the economy, on the 
assumption of credit market frictions.
18 The narrow credit channel (also labeled as bank 
lending channel; see Hall 2001) concentrates on the role of banks as lenders (Roosa 1951; 
Bernanke and Blinder 1988). Banks rely heavily on demand deposits subjected to reserve 
requirements as an important source of funding economic activity. When there is a change in 
total reserves as a result of changes in monetary policy, bank reserves would be affected, 
thereby affecting their supply of loans to the private sector. Given that a significant number 
of firms and households depend on bank lending, ultimately aggregate demand and inflation 
would be affected. Changes in the central bank rate can also affect the supply of loans in view 
of the change in the cost of acquiring reserves. For example, an increase in the central bank 
rate reduces the supply of loans since it is more expensive for banks to acquire reserves (or if 
reserves are not legally required, the same effect is present since opportunity costs are raised). 
This effect can be significant when loans are imperfect substitutes for other forms of finance 
(Hall 2001).  
The broad credit channel [also labeled as balance sheet channel; see Hall (2001)] 
describes how the financial health of borrowers can affect the supply of finance and, 
ultimately, aggregate demand (Bernanke and Gertler 1989 and 1999; Bernanke, Gertler, and 
Gilchrist 1999; Bernanke et al. 1999). This channel relies heavily on an imperfect 
information assumption in terms of the supply of external finance to firms. This is that 
lenders charge borrowers a premium to cover monitoring costs and it is the firm’s financial 
position that determines their external finance premium. So that low (high) gearing, i.e., high 
(low) internal finance, implies small (large) external finance premium. Two important 
implications follow. The first is that there is a role for corporate cash flows. A policy-induced 
increase (decrease) in the rate of interest raises (lowers) the firm’s gearing ratio, i.e., the 
proportion of a given investment that must be financed from external funds, thereby 
increasing (decreasing) the required premium to cover monitoring costs. The second 
                                                 
18 The assumption of credit market frictions is important in that it is normally hypothesized that lending and 
borrowing are indifferent amongst internal funds, bank borrowing, and equity finance. This assumption relies on 
a frictionless world, where lenders and borrowers have the same information about risks and returns, costlessly 
monitor the use and repayment of borrowed funds (in the case of lenders), and are not faced with search and 
transaction costs. In addition to these agency costs, lenders and borrowers have no concerns about corporate 
controls and there is no tax discrimination of sources of finance. In the real world of credit markets, frictions are 
abundant so that the heroic assumptions of frictionless credit markets do not generally hold.  
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implication is that asset prices play an important role, as they determine the value of 
collateral that bank customers (firms and consumers) can use to support loan applications. In 
the presence of information asymmetries, agency costs, and other credit market frictions, 
collateral values are paramount. As the value of the collateral declines, say because of falling 
asset prices, due to higher policy-induced interest rates, the borrower premium increases. 
Consequently, the impact on investment and consumption can be significant as a result of this 
“financial accelerator” effect. Mutatis mutandis, in the case where the value of collateral 
increases.  
Still a further omission is that monetary policy may also influence aggregate supply 
through changes in the rate of interest. Fixed and working capital may need financial 
resources since current inputs should be paid before output can be sold and these resources 
carry financial costs. Therefore, interest rate paid on working capital affects production costs 
and, thus, the supply side of aggregate output. A number of writers provide evidence of this 
“cost channel” of monetary policy. Chowdhury, Hoffman, and Schabert (2006) is a recent 
contribution that restates the importance of this particular channel of monetary policy and 
provides relevant evidence in its support.  
 
3.3 The Equilibrium Real Rate of Interest  
The equilibrium real rate of interest plays a crucial role in the NCM. The discrepancy 
between the actual and the equilibrium rate of interest has been termed the real interest rate 
gap and can be used to evaluate the stance of monetary policy. It is thereby a useful 
theoretical concept in the analysis of the relationship between the independence of monetary 
policy and economic fluctuations (Weber, Lemke, and Worms 2008). In terms of the six 
equations above, and equation (3) in particular, it is clear that the equilibrium real rate of 
interest secures output at the supply equilibrium level (zero output gap) consistent with 
constant inflation. Another way of explaining this result is to say that when the real rate of 
interest is reached, then there is no problem of deficient (or indeed excessive) aggregate 
demand. The real interest rate is at an equilibrium level of RR*. This equilibrium rate is often 
seen to correspond to what is called the Wicksellian “natural rate” of interest. Wicksell 
(1898) distinguished between the money rate of interest (as observed) and the “natural rate” 
of interest, which was the interest rate that was neutral to prices in the real market, and the 
interest rate at which supply and demand in the real market was at equilibrium. Although it is 
not self-evident from the model outlined above, this “natural rate” of interest equates savings 
and investment and does so at a zero output gap. This is implicitly assumed to be consistent  
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with the full employment of labor in that flexible real wages would permit the labor market to 
clear with full employment compatible with the zero output gap.  
It is also the case that the use of RR* in NCM models with the emphasis on price 
stability provides an important benchmark for monetary policy analysis in the context of 
models with a single rate of interest, with no banks and no monetary aggregates. Under these 
assumptions, the reaction of the interest rate policy instrument to movements in RR* can 
ensure price stability. Wicksell’s (1898) natural rate of interest thesis, however, recognizes 
the existence of different interest rates that can determine aggregate demand. For example, 
loan rates are important when bank credit is the main source of financing for firms. Under 
such circumstances where the rate of interest on bank loans differs from the policy rate of 
interest, RR* may not be a useful indicator for monetary policy. De Fiore and Tristani (2008) 
show that under such circumstances, and on the assumption of asymmetric information and of 
credit treated in nominal terms in an otherwise NCM model, RR* is heavily model 
dependent. It reacts differently to aggregate shocks depending on the underlying model 
assumptions. The crucial distinguishing assumption in this context is whether markets are 
frictionless or not. Indeed, in markets characterized by friction, a further implication is that 
monetary policy exerts real effects even in the long run. Consequently, “it might be difficult 
for a central bank that is uncertain about the true model of the economy to identify its 
movements and to use it as regular indicator for the conduct of monetary policy” (De Fiore 
and Tristani 2008: 33). 
In his Treatise on Money, Keynes (1930: 139) accepted the notion of the “natural rate 
of interest.” He argued there: 
 
 “Following Wicksell, it will be convenient to call the rate of 
interest which would cause the second term of our fundamental 
equation to be zero the natural rate of interest, and the rate 
which actually prevails the market rate of interest. Thus the 
natural rate of interest is the rate at which saving and the value of 
investment are exactly balanced, so that the price level of output 
as a whole […] exactly corresponds to the money rate of the 
efficiency earnings of the factors of production. Every departure 
of the market rate from the natural rate tends, on the other hand, 
to set up a disturbance of the price level […] We have, therefore, 
something with which the ordinary quantity equation does not 
furnish us, namely, a simple and direct explanation why a rise in 
the bank rate tends, in so far as it modifies the effective rates of 




However, in The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (GT in short), 
Keynes (1936) explicitly rejects the idea of a unique natural rate of interest and, in effect, 
argues that there is a natural rate of interest corresponding to each level of effective demand, 
which would bring savings and investment into balance.  
 
“In my Treatise on Money I defined what purported to be a 
unique rate of interest, which I called the natural rate of 
interest—namely, the rate of interest which, in the terminology 
of my Treatise, preserved equality between the rate of saving (as 
there defined) and the rate of investment […] I had, however, 
overlooked the fact that in any given society there is, on this 
definition, a different natural rate of interest for each 
hypothetical level of employment. And, similarly, for every rate 
of interest there is a level of employment for which the rate is the 
‘natural’ rate, in the sense that the system will be in equilibrium 
with that rate of interest and that level of employment. Thus it 
was a mistake to speak of the natural rate of interest or to suggest 
that the above definition would yield a unique value for the rate 
of interest irrespective of the level of employment. I had not then 
understood that, in certain conditions, the system could be in 
equilibrium with less than full employment.” (Keynes, 1936: 
242–243) 
 
Keynes (1936) went on to argue that  
 
“If there is any such rate of interest, which is unique and 
significant, it must be the rate which we might term the neutral 
rate of interest, namely, the natural rate in the above sense which 
is consistent with full employment, given the other parameters of 
the system; though this rate might be better described, perhaps, 
as the optimum rate […] The above gives us, once again, the 
answer to the question as to what tacit assumption is required to 
make sense of the classical theory of the rate of interest. This 
theory assumes either that the actual rate of interest is always 
equal to the neutral rate of interest in the sense in which we have 
just defined the latter, or alternatively that the actual rate of 
interest is always equal to the rate of interest which will maintain 
employment at some specified constant level. If the traditional 
theory is thus interpreted, there is little or nothing in its practical 
conclusions to which we need take exception. The classical 
theory assumes that the banking authority or natural forces cause 
the market-rate of interest to satisfy one or other of the above 
conditions.” (pp. 243–244) 
 
The NCM model portrays an economy in which the interest rate can be adjusted to 
secure equilibrium in terms of a zero output gap and a balance between aggregate demand 
and aggregate supply (alternatively between planned savings and planned investment). The 
rate at which this materializes is, to repeat, the real equilibrium rate of interest. This is an  
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“anchor” or benchmark for monetary policy and corresponds to the intercept in equation (3); 
it is the case that a shift in the state of confidence and expectations leading to a shift in the 
investment schedule would lead to a shift in the real equilibrium rate of interest. Arestis and 
Sawyer (2008) show that any real equilibrium rate of interest would be defined for a specific 
fiscal stance, specific world demand, and specific set of “animal spirits” influencing 
investment, in addition to preferences and technology. Another example is the study by 
Laubach and Williams (2001) where it is demonstrated through the use of the Kalman filter 
technique that RR* estimates vary “one-to-one” with changes in the trend growth rate of 
potential output. As the factors suggested in these studies vary, so will the real rate of 
interest. It is, thus, the case that equation (3) requires the policymaker to take a view and 
formulate policy on the basis of implicit assumptions regarding the real rate of interest 
(Orphanides and Williams 2002). Consequently, there is the real difficulty and uncertainty 
that relate to establishing robust estimates of the monetary rules of the type summarized in 
equation (3).  
Furthermore, the real equilibrium rate of interest should be readily computable from 
actual economic data. Such data should be available with sufficient precision and whenever 
the need is there. Weber, Lemke, and Worms (2008) demonstrate persuasively that although 
the real rate of interest could play an important role in the conduct of current monetary 
policy, there are serious problems with it. There is the problem with the interest rate gap that 
“is not a sufficient summary variable reflecting the overall pressure on inflation in the sense 
that it captures all possible determinants of price changes” (Weber, Lemke, and Worms 2008: 
13). Cost-push shocks are a significant source to inflation and an important element of 
inflation information to monetary policymakers, but are “not mirrored by the natural rate of 
interest.” Furthermore, the empirical estimates for RR* are extremely imprecise, so that the 
real equilibrium rate of interest “is not readily computable from observable economic data.” 
This problem is prevalent whichever method might be used for estimating the real 
equilibrium rate of interest.
19 In Arestis and Chortareas (2008) a more theory-oriented 
approach is pursued, which attempts to quantify the United States RR* as it emerges from a 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) framework. Here, again, a time-varying 
measure of the equilibrium real interest rate is arrived at; this rate responds to preferences and 
technology shocks and, as such, it is time varying. In view of the difficulties that relate to the 
real rate of interest as just discussed, two serious propositions emerge. The first is what 
                                                 
19 As Weber, Lemke, and Worms (2008: 9) note, the various approaches utilized to estimate RR* may be 
categorized as follows: “(i) (univariate) filtering approaches; (ii) structural econometric models […] and (iii) 
fully-fledged equilibrium models with microeconomic foundations.”      
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follows from the Weber, Lemke, and Worms (2008: 13) analysis, namely “the natural rate 
cannot be a surrogate for a detailed analysis of the real and monetary forces relevant to the 
identification of risks to price stability.” The second problem is that in view of the problems 
identified in this section, a great deal of discretion should be applied in the conduct of 
monetary policy, but then the degree of discretion required might not be compatible with the 
IT theoretical principles. 
 
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This contribution has attempted to highlight the main characteristics of what has come to be 
known as the New Consensus in macroeconomics. The term “consensus” is very interesting, 
for it pinpoints that a rare level of agreement among economists of the traditional persuasion 
on macro issues has been achieved. Such a consensus has not been witnessed since the late 
1960s/early 1970s when the first consensus was in place, the neoclassical synthesis, with its 
focus on the IS/LM model. 
NCM has been generally analyzed under the assumption of a closed economy. This 
paper has dealt with the open economy NCM where the role of the exchange rate provides an 
additional channel of monetary policy. Not only has this paper attempted to clarify the main 
features of the NCM, but it has also focused on its main policy implications.  
In doing so the paper has also critically raised a number of issues with both the 
NCM’s theoretical foundations, as well as with its monetary policy, which is, of course, the 
IT framework. On both accounts, we find that a number of problems and weaknesses are 
present. Two such weaknesses have been stressed; both emanate from the absence of money 
and banks in the NCM model, and from the way the equilibrium real rate of interest is 
utilized in the same model. It is the case, then, that NCM is based on inconsistencies and a 
great deal of “ad hocery.” This suggests that a great deal more research is necessary to tackle 
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